Traditional secrets management and identity tools were built around the assumption that most credentials in a company belong to human employees, with service accounts and API keys as a smaller, secondary category. That assumption is now backwards: AI agents are issuing their own API calls, chaining together tool access, and often holding credentials with broader scope than the humans who built them, because nobody has built a permission model specifically designed for how an autonomous agent actually uses access, briefly, programmatically, and often across many systems in a single task.
This product is a secrets management and authentication layer purpose-built for AI agents: short-lived, scoped credentials issued per task rather than long-lived static keys, an audit trail that can actually explain what an agent accessed and why, and policy controls that let a security team say exactly what an agent is allowed to touch without having to hand it the same broad access a human engineer might reasonably need. It is meant to sit alongside, not necessarily replace, a company's existing human-identity tools and its existing secrets manager, specifically covering the agent and machine-identity gap those tools were not built for.
The wedge is security and platform engineering teams at companies that have already deployed agents into production and have started to notice, often through an internal audit or a near-miss incident, that nobody can fully account for what credentials their agents actually hold.